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Education is a practice of futurity. It seeks to prepare the minds and bodies 
that will construct and inhabit the future. Design in the architectural 
disciplines—the architectures—also prepares buildings (landscape, edifice, 
city, countryside) for future dwelling.1 This article examines the use of the 
imagination in the design process and how it may be employed to posit 
better future worlds despite, and counter to, the prevalence of neoliberal 
imaginaries. Utopianism as both pedagogical method and design process 
is presented, as is the employment of the senses to bring the site and 
its materials alive in the embodied imagination. Both are methods for 
envisioning scenarios for whole ecological, sensual, and emotional worlds to 
create better designs for dwelling spaces. Processes of making are shown 
as interwoven with imagined stories, simulations, and situations in a series 
of sections. Each section attempts to describe a whole realm of making. 
The sections are thus loosely held together within the structure of the 
article to allow the reader space for imagination and discovery in the 
terrae incognitae between them.
 1 I use ‘building’ to describe landscape here as a provocation, but also as a more robust descriptor than 
the commonly used term ‘built environment’. ‘Built environment’, as it is generally employed, fails to 
describe landscapes which are built, but which are not urban, such as farms or national parks. Thus 
to think of landscapes as buildings is more inclusive, but also it also forces an acknowledgement of 
landscapes as the result of acts of will, physical effort, artifice, and imagination.
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Once Upon a Time
‘Once’ names the specific, the particular. ‘Upon’ signifies emplacing, situating, taking 
place. ‘A time’ sets a temporal context. Before the phrase ‘once upon a time’ is written 
or spoken there is a suspension: a ‘nowhen’, a nowhere, a nothing. The phrase 
prepares us to be temporally and spatially situated. It enacts a ritual that creates 
a space in the imagination for a story to unfold. What follows ‘once upon a time’ 
is an important set of variables that begin to happen, to take place in that cleared, 
prepared site in the mind’s eye. Did I say ‘mind’s eye’? I meant to say the mind’s body: 
the imagination is not merely visual, but multi-sensory and emotional. Stories are 
not just visual, they are visceral. I could just as easily have said the body’s mind. Like 
lovers, they belong to each other. Belonging: being and longing.
Once upon a time there was a princess who lived in a castle. The princess had everything 
she could ever want: jewels, fine clothing, the most delicious food in the kingdom. Still, 
though, she was sad.
The castle is a cold and sorrowful place, isn’t it? Those jewels are joyless rocks, and 
the supposedly delicious food tastes like cardboard and smells of nothing. The 
sadness that enters in the last sentence sets the tone, the mood, the atmosphere. 
You can probably feel the rough surface of the castle’s stone and the stout planks of 
the princess’s dinner table. Yes, that’s you I’m talking to. Hello out there. Welcome 
to my mind, and welcome to the place I’ve cleared and prepared for both of us in 
our imaginations. It’s nice to share this scene with you. It’s nice to have made a little 
space for meaning: what does anything mean without emotion and sensation?
Once upon a time we built the places of our heart’s desires
I want to imagine with you a scenario in which desire and pleasure are at the core of 
the design process. The processes of design have much in common with the processes 
of imaginative play. They both require the envisioning and rehearsal of scenarios, 
and they are both often utopian. Utopias are ways of analysing and evaluating 
situations through narratives that allow us to test possible worlds. They can be used 
as methods both to imagine better worlds (not necessarily perfect ones). Or they can 
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be used to picture what might happen if things go wrong: meet dystopia, utopia’s 
evil twin. Sometimes our heart’s desires don’t lead to healthy choices, and working 
through utopian scenarios is a way to figure out which of our desires may feasibly be 
fulfilled (which moves them from the realm of the utopian to the attainable)—and 
to what extent. The limits of fulfilment under capitalism and its attendant structural 
inequalities can, in many ways, only be tested first as utopian scenarios. Both design 
and imaginative play also allow us to test potentially dangerous scenarios without 
endangering actual subjects in real life experiments.
The experiment I want to undertake here, though, is a daring but not a dangerous 
one, and it is potentially enriching. I want to dare to imagine a world where people 
live lives characterised by ease, pleasure, and sensuality; a world in which everyone 
has enough to satisfy both their basic needs and a generous selection of superfluous 
desires. This world is one that must be imagined in detail. Such prefigurative work 
is an act of make-believe. Ruth Levitas refers to the ‘imaginary reconstitution of 
society’ (Levitas, 2013: xi); but the act of imagining encompasses the imaginary 
reconstitution, not only of society as such, but of the spaces in which society exists. 
Make-believe is a practice that has agency. Our dream-worlds and our life-worlds are 
constantly interacting to shape place and dwelling. Using utopian imagination as 
method, then; for enacting positive change in the built and lived landscape is the 
only way to ensure that our future world provides adequate pleasure to support a 
good life for all.
This article will examine the roles designers play in humankind’s futurity—as 
makers, envisioners, and tastemakers—in light of contingent and relational models 
of utopianism, rather than those that are simplifying, teleological, and diagrammatic. 
Further, the creation of more fulfilling and sustainable places to live requires the 
reshaping of popular beliefs to change patterns of everyday life and consumption. The 
article specifically addresses the persuasive, propagandistic nature of representation 
for design and asks that designers concentrate on using their powers for good.
Naturally, none of this can happen without education; and education, like 
utopianism, is a practice of futurity. It seeks to prepare the minds and bodies 
that will construct and inhabit the future. The educational experience that most 
people receive, in the architectures or any other discipline, however, is one that is 
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designed to prepare them for a particular future.2 This involves preparing students 
for preconceived roles, often employing what Paulo Freire (2007) called ‘banking 
education’, in which students are envisioned as containers into which knowledge is 
deposited. The nation-state, for example, has an interest in creating patriotic citizens, 
while the neoliberal project seeks to create ‘flexible’ subjects who are ‘lifelong 
learners’. A fully democratic model of education might resemble neither of these, 
seeking, rather, to put into practice equality and striving towards emancipation (see 
Simons & Masschelein, 2011; Ross, 1991): both emancipation (here the freedom 
that comes with ability and empowerment) and equality are mutually assured and 
maintained through everyday practices. The ‘learning society’, while expressing 
‘principles of a universal humanity and a promise of progress that seem to transcend 
the nation’ (Simons & Masschelein, 2007: 9), is undermined by its risk-aversion and 
also by the absence of emancipation from studenthood itself at formal education’s 
end. As Gert Biesta warns:
The desire to make education strong, secure, predictable, and risk-free is 
an attempt to forget that at the end of the day education should aim at 
making itself dispensable—no teacher wants their students to remain 
eternal students—which means that education necessarily needs to have an 
orientation toward the freedom and independence of those being educated. 
(Biesta, 2014: 2, emphasis in original)
While learning may continue through life, education as formal learning is a 
transitional period and thus should come to an end, otherwise the student becomes 
stuck in this threshold, forever a student; never released into full competency and 
agency. Education should build the capacity to apply the imaginal to the real and thus 
to transform it, and in doing so make other, better futures possible. In this, education 
 2 I refer to architectures in the plural because it assumes the equality of fields which are complementary 
to, but not subservient to (or subsets of) architecture, including planning, landscape architecture, 
urban design, interior architecture, theatrical set design, and so on. ‘Architectures’ is a term which, 
like ‘knowledges’, resists totalizing and hierarchical tendencies and values both diversity in the 
present and the possibility of the emergence of other allied yet distinctive fields in the future. 
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might resemble what David Graeber, reflecting a common position in anarchist 
theory, refers to as ‘prefigurative politics’, ‘the idea that the organizational form that 
an activist group takes should embody the kind of society we wish to create’ (Graeber, 
2013: 23). Graeber applies this to activism, particularly to the Occupy movement. 
The ‘democracy project’, to which Graeber refers in the title of his book, should be 
brought into education, in particular to encourage dissent. Democracy, conceived 
as a project, allies itself naturally to emancipation and equality as practices. There is 
no room for practices of dissent in an education that is ‘strong, secure, predictable, 
and risk-free’, nor in the society which it might produce. A project of democracy 
exists as a ‘social ecology’ (another term from anarchist theory; see Bookchin, 2005) 
of interpenetrating, mutually informing ideas that exist in the world and in human 
associations. That social ecology must be nested into the ecology of the physical, 
inhabited world.
In both education and professional practice, design processes are currently 
being re-envisioned in ways that are analogous to natural processes and ecologies 
(see Corner, 1999; Meyer, 2000; Reed & Lister, 2014). This makes sense if we are 
to design, make, and build in responsively cohesive ways. Envisioning design as 
a conversation with sites, materials, processes, habitats and habits, and so on 
engenders the according of agency to places and all they are made of. The increasing 
interpenetration of social, cultural, and physical worlds with new media ecologies 
further underscores the importance of envisioning these processes differently.
Design involves drawing, making, modelling, and simulating, which is yet 
another practice which can be envisioned as having an ecological structure. As an 
imaginative activity, simulation is aided by design iterations involving the standard 
modes of representation for design. Simulation can be immensely rich if we are 
simulating the right things. Simulation takes place in the brain (and the mind) 
during the design process, and the designer rehearses movements and activities in 
space during simulations using the same neural pathways that they would if they 
were physically negotiating and interacting with an actual site. In this way, we use 
the mind’s body rather than the mind’s eye. These simulations necessarily mimic not 
just spaces, forms, objects, and buildings, but situations, sensations, emotions, and 
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interactions. ‘Modes of attending to scenes and events spawn socialities, identities, 
dream worlds, bodily states and public feelings of all kinds’, writes Kathleen Stewart 
(2007: 10). The possible futures to which we might be directed; and the possible 
worlds we might prefigure, are embedded in this rich, relational past and present.
Making a Living or Making a Killing
I mentioned above that the possible worlds and narratives we imagine can positively 
or negatively shape our beliefs. We have all come to increasingly inhabit a dystopian 
world—a real world—that is shaped by an imaginary that is at once utopian and 
anti-utopian. This imaginary speaks a language of freedom and flexibility, but in 
practice it encloses and constrains while sowing precarity—and precarity puts people 
on the defensive, whereas flexibility implies enough security to explore options. This 
dystopia is the product of magical thinking. It is shaped by an imaginary that exhibits 
the hallmarks of magical religiosity: ‘the naive, need-based, unquestioning hope 
in the face of experience, reason and refutation is a feature…not of Utopia but of 
religion’ (Howells, 2015: 24). Howells assigns these attributes to all religion, but his 
formulation needs elaboration, as it seemingly assigns to all registers of religiosity 
the character of fundamentalism. Let us say, then, that this imaginary bears the 
hallmarks of fundamentalist religiosity, a construct reinforced by the prevalent use 
of the term ‘market fundamentalism’ to describe much capitalist ideology. In this 
imaginary, individuals are alone in the world and their success, or lack thereof, is 
solely the product of their own efforts. There is no expectation that any individual 
who succeeds should have any obligation (or any wish) to share the fruits of their 
success. Individuals achieve their successes or failures in an economic system that 
is perceived to be guided by an underlying moral compass, the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the market, a concept crudely adapted from the writings of Adam Smith. Financial 
success is thus believed to be a mark of human goodness and worthiness—perhaps the 
mark. Lavish displays of wealth, even in the presence of pitiful displays of poverty, are 
therefore acceptable because they are the trappings of goodness and represent those 
‘goods’ to which the impoverished should aspire and which their lack of striving has 
denied them. The ‘invisible hand’ will also see to it that the biological environment is 
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safeguarded for the future so that the natural resources which support the lifestyles 
of the rich and famous remain abundant. The individual who has succeeded in this 
system, some like to say, has ‘made a killing’.
This construct, as I have noted above, is at once anti-utopian and utopian. Lucy 
Sargisson writes that ‘anti-utopianism is not just dystopianism or gloominess about 
the future. Rather, it is a phenomenon that resists the utopian impulse’ (Sargisson, 
2012: 22). It insists upon the appearance of bloody-minded pragmatism over foolish 
dreaming. This constrains the political left by painting it as obliviously utopian when 
it seeks to define what the future ought to be, just as it fuels the right’s claims to 
the superiority of rationality over hope when it seeks to insist that injustice is a 
‘natural’ condition. A stern mask of anti-utopianism is applied over the ghostly face 
of neoliberalism’s magical utopianism, which, at its libertarian or ‘anarchocapitalist’ 
extremes, displays all the marks of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism’s most wicked 
spectres—the Inquisition, possibly—are summoned as Sargisson continues:
The utopianism that drives religious fundamentalism is perfectionist, 
closed, static and it has divine sanction. This combines with core elements 
of religious fundamentalism to create a drive towards purity and purge. In 
proselytizing religions this is even more dangerous because expansionism 
and territoriality are added to the mix. (Sargisson, 2012: 41)
This perfectionist utopia allows free-market neoliberalism to make the claim, for 
example, that the market is not yet completely self-regulating because it is not yet 
completely free.
The cultural and political theorist Jeremy Gilbert has described this magical system 
as ‘competitive individualism’ (Gilbert, 2014); whilst Neal Curtis, also a cultural theorist, 
has used the term ‘idiotism’ (derived not from the use of the word as a slur or an archaic 
descriptor for mental illness, but rather from the Greek idiotes [ιδιοτες], which describes 
a person who is private, who lacks the ability to function publicly (Curtis, 2013)). I 
prefer the former, though I have sympathies with the latter. Competitive individualism 
is a key narrative of capitalism and the foundation stone for neoliberalism, the system 
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in which governments everywhere are supposedly being minimised, but which instead 
have become more authoritarian, corporatised, privatised, and marketised; and have 
remained large despite shedding many of their altruistic functions and obligations. 
This is in response to the progressive loss of power in the nation-state to the free-
floating power in the ‘space of flows’ (as formulated by Manuel Castells, 1989, 2004) 
in what Zygmunt Bauman calls ‘liquid modernity’.3 Competitive individualism and 
neoliberalism have literally been ‘making a killing’ by fuelling war and terrorism, 
squandering planetary resources; and polluting and destroying wantonly in processes 
that are flatteringly described as ‘wealth creation’ despite having actually created a 
preponderance of ‘illth’ (as John Ruskin [1921: 97–8] once termed wealth’s opposite).
For Curtis, the idios, the realm of the private, is identified with the practice of 
the enclosures, which have been ‘the primary means for capitalist accumulation over 
the centuries’ (2013: 14). This enclosing tendency takes place across all realms of 
human endeavour anywhere a commons and a common good may be founded. This 
includes digital realms (for example Microsoft’s ongoing enclosures in the name of 
‘intellectual property’; see Stallman, 2005), cultural realms (such as the practices 
of corporate ‘cool-hunting’; see Klein, 2001), and the landscape (from the early 
enclosures in England which pushed the peasantry, often violently, off the land and 
into the proletariat; see Williams, 1973). In late capitalism, enclosures continue apace 
in all these realms, but are obscured by liquid modernity’s incessant shape-shifting. 
This is the sort of world in which ‘flexible’ workers who are ‘life-long learners’ can 
flourish. What is sorely needed is a positive counter-imaginary of prosperity and 
flourishing that is identified not with destruction but with careful management 
of resources and ecologies, with sharing, creating economies of care, and planning 
constructively for a future in which all will share. In contrast to ‘making a killing’, this 
could and should be called ‘making a living’, which would redefine success in terms 
of whole lives rather than whole paychecks.
 3 As Bauman explains: ‘What makes modernity “liquid” is the compulsive and obsessive, unstoppably 
accelerating “modernization”, through which—just like liquids—no forms of social life are able to 
retain their shapes for long’ (Bauman, 2010: 330; see also Bauman, 2011).
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Making Sense
Those who argue for competitive individualism tend to frame their claims in terms 
of cold rationality, which allows the masquerade of eschewing morality. Decisions 
that are made on qualitative or emotional bases are suspect, and moral arguments 
are viewed as subservient to rational calculations. Ugly buildings, for example, are 
justified on the basis of their efficiency or their cost-effectiveness. Such decisions may 
be rational (arguably), but they are not sensible or reasonable. Calculation does not 
equal evaluation (or valuation, for that matter). What ‘makes sense’ to most people on 
a daily basis are those things that provide them with convenience, comfort, pleasure, 
and satisfaction, and these things are almost never merely selfish concerns. The value 
that people see in their lives is usually dependent upon and interactive with the lives 
and desires of others. Seeking the approval of others, as well as their satisfaction, is 
fundamental to human behaviour. The decisions about what is reasonable are based 
in the evidence of the senses and the emotions. By this token an ugly building is 
unreasonable and makes no sense. It is also selfish, lacking any intrinsic worth of 
its own. Meaning and values are sensual and embodied—looking good and feeling 
good are moral and ethical qualities, and they are dependent upon their context.4 
As Tim Cresswell points out, ‘[t]he geographical setting of actions plays a central role 
in defining our judgment of whether actions are good or bad’ (Cresswell, 1996: 9).
For the design process, the implications are fairly clear. If an architect is asked 
to design a building and the sole considerations are pecuniary—to maximise space 
and minimise cost—then it will be exceedingly difficult for the architect to make 
a sensible building. The logical extreme is demonstrated by the big box retail 
building, which is exactly as it sounds—a big box of a building which maximises 
 4 Morals are often taken to be universal and acontextual, and ethics contextual. In line with the theories 
of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff, I would argue that morals are situated and embodied, and thus 
just as contextual as ethics in their own way, if they are not, in fact, one and the same thing (Lakoff, 
1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). I have written about this elsewhere: ‘I should probably also make the 
point that the Greek root of the word “moral” signifies custom—which suggests that morals exist in 
the relational realm of everyday life, rather than in abstract “higher” realms or in abstract financialised 
realms such as “the market”—and that “economy” comes from Greek again, the oikos, or household’ 
(Waterman and Catlow, 2015).
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retail space but in all other regards is utterly ungenerous to and/or destructive of its 
environment. The emergence of the computer as the preferred design tool, often to 
the exclusion of all others, reduces the sensory engagement in the design process to 
a single sense, that of vision, which actively abets the process of reducing buildings 
(including landscapes) to mere (financial) instruments. As architect Santiago Pérez 
puts it: ‘The gap between computation and making today may be seen as a rapidly 
developing over-reliance on parametric instrumentality, at the expense of material 
invention and discovery’ (Pérez, 2012: 382). It might be argued that at least buildings 
produced solely through digital means will ‘look good’, but a building that looks 
good but that doesn’t do good or feel good in its material reality is a failed building. 
Again, it doesn’t make sense.
An active engagement with multisensual materials and media is key to creating 
buildings that make sense. What is necessary is a particular engagement that 
architect Kyna Leski calls ‘material reasoning’. Leski refers to Antoni Gaudí’s methods 
of making and modeling, specifically his designs for Barcelona’s celebrated cathedral, 
the Sagrada Familia. Its arches were tested with a model made of draped chains, 
which inverted the building’s structure. His methods include exploration of ‘material 
behavior, material geometry, material tolerances, and material analogies’ (Leski, 
2015: 78). I would extend the analogy of material reasoning to include consideration 
of the sensual qualities of materials, something Pérez approaches more closely with 
his similar concept of material intelligence which ‘combines parametric workflows, 
traditional crafts and advanced rapid-prototyping and manufacturing’ (Pérez, 2012: 
383). But the concept still needs expanding, and the framing of design processes as 
‘workflows’ smacks of the liquid modern vocabulary of neoliberalism. First, materials 
used in modelling in the studio may be employed to test textures, acoustics, and 
even the smell (using wood in models to bring to mind the odor of panelling or 
decking, for example). Secondly, the sensual qualities of materials used in the studio 
may be used to recall and make more vivid the sensual qualities of the site itself, 
and to make it more real in the imagination during design explorations. A riverside 
site might be brought to mind by pressing one’s thumbs into clay—to recall the 
alluvial mud encountered—and, perhaps, to make drawings, choosing the paper and 
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drawing medium to recall the texture of reeds and grasses. Recalling a site as three-
dimensional, sensual, and real rather than merely a red-bordered abstraction drawn 
on a plan is an important step to resist treating it merely as a commodity or a surface 
that exists only to be filled. Importantly, as Cresswell tells us:
We live in a world of meaning. We exist in and are surrounded by places—
centers of meaning. Places are neither totally material nor completely 
mental; they are combinations of the material and mental and cannot be 
reduced to either. (Cresswell, 1996: 13)
A further boon is that the designer also becomes more present, embodied, and thus 
becomes a more human presence in the design imaginary. Perhaps thinking in these 
terms will also help us to demand more, for example, from processes of remote 
sensing for geospatial analysis, which presently are composed primarily of statistical 
and visual data.
It is perhaps important to note, as well, that these processes are certainly 
available to capitalist modes of production, and that luxury products, for example, 
are often the result of careful, embodied design. What can redeem this process from 
the mere creation of sensually fulfilling commodities is a concomitant awareness of 
context, an embedded altruism, and an ecology of thinking: that is, it is not merely 
the tools and the product, but the whole mind-set we bring to design. Contemporary 
placemaking processes rely heavily on the imaginal, ‘which emphasizes the centrality 
of images’ (Bottici, 2014: 5); and the imaginary, which ‘primarily means what exists 
only in fancy and has no real existence and is opposed to real or actual’ (Bottici, 
2014: 7). This is reflected both in the luxurious imagery of the architectures—filled 
with birds, balloons, well-groomed people, and a flash of lens flare—and in the 
language—in which a different ‘sense’ is made. This is the ‘sense of place’, or the 
‘sense of community’, which here refers not to immersive, reflexive, multisensual 
engagement, but to a general feeling that something might be the case. Places 
that are at best humdrum, common and stultifying are presented as ecstatic and 
playful, but actual well-being created by fulfilling places is as far away from this as 
certainty is from a hunch. The relentless pursuit of empty glamour—where pursuit 
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is merely the ‘thrill of the chase’—has for decades trumped the pursuit of happiness. 
And here the importance of the pursuit as practice, pastime, and lived experience 
is key to overturning the chimerical, illusionary, neoliberal sense of happiness and 
well-being. Here the ‘art of living’ is one of cultivated goodness, and thus authentic 
in that it is ‘authored’. The design of places that are capable of sustaining such 
authentic fulfilment requires more of the designer than merely pretty pictures and 
a ‘sense’ of goodness. It requires the deep and rigorous exercise of the suppositional 
imagination.
Moses Supposes
I have sometimes used a short studio exercise in which I ask students to come up 
with as many words for sounds and states of water as possible. The exercise, of 
course, begins with onomatopoeia such as ‘splash’ and ‘gurgle’. Hilarity is allowed 
and encouraged with words like ‘piss’ and ‘piddle’. States of water—waves, ripples, 
limpid pools, froth, are all explored. I then give them an assignment to design a 
garden room that provides/contains these experiences. They are encouraged to think 
about the sensual experience of water, for example, sliding their hand into cool, 
calm water on a hot summer day. I then ask the students, as part of their process, to 
play with water, and they are sent outside with cups and buckets. I also encourage 
them to draw a bath full of water at home, and play with the water as if they were 
children, taking delight in its qualities and listening to the amusing noises it makes. 
Ploop, slosh, tinkle, plash. The delight of this exercise is immediately apparent to 
the students, and they all comment on how different and refreshing it feels to begin 
with a proposition that involves senses other than vision, in this case primarily touch 
and sound.
Design in the architectures is a work of supposition: ‘Suppose it’s like this’. The 
designer is supposing a scenario. The designer, like Moses (who supposes his toeses 
are roses), knows(es) this is only a scenario, but introducing a realm of (in this case 
comic) possibility is at the very heart of the act. Writing about the important work of 
Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2000) on the cognitive theory of pretence, Peter 
Carruthers sums up that they:
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Argue that we need to recognize the existence of a distinct type of attitude, 
alongside belief and desire—namely, the attitude of supposing. When 
children pretend, they are supposing that something is the case (e.g. that 
the banana is a telephone, that they have an invisible friend called ‘Wendy’, 
etc.), and they act out their pretence within the scope of that supposition. 
Moreover, supposing can’t be reduced to believing, or to desiring, or to 
any combination thereof (nor can it be reduced to any sort of planning or 
intending). It therefore needs to be assigned its own ‘box’ within a functional 
boxology of the human mind. (Carruthers, 2006: 90; emphases in original)
Carruthers points out that Nichols and Stich refer to the attitude of supposing in 
pretence and imaginative play, but the construct is directly applicable to design. 
Further, the act of supposition is accompanied by simulation. The designer who 
works at the scale of architecture and landscape cannot prototype their design in the 
studio: they cannot work at full scale to test a design. The designer must therefore 
undertake to simulate the experience of the site or building as faithfully as possible, 
and then to work through imaginative scenarios to assess whether a design iteration 
is more or less successful.
Gaston Bachelard remarked that ‘it is impossible to think the vowel sound ah 
without a tautening of the vocal chords. In other words, we read ah and the voice is 
ready to sing’ (Bachelard, 1964: 197). This prescient observation is now confirmed 
by studies in cognitive neuroscience of mirror-neuron phenomena. These, Mark 
Johnson says:
Suggest that understanding is a form of simulation. To see another person 
perform an action activates some of the same sensorimotor areas, as if the 
observer herself were performing the action. This deep and pre-reflective 
level of engagement with others reveals our most profound bodily 
understanding of other people, and it shows our intercorporeal social 
connectedness. Moreover, mirror-neuron research supports the hypothesis 
that imagination is a form of simulation. Research by Marc Jeannerod shows 
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that imagining certain motor actions activates some of the same parts of the 
brain that are involved in actually performing that action. Imagining a visual 
scene also activates areas of the brain that would be activated if we actually 
perceived that scene. (Johnson, 2007: 161–2; emphases in original)
Simulation has incredible power in the human mind, and designers can think of 
themselves as ‘flight simulators’ who test flying the site’s design in a simulated world 
before real lives are at stake in real situations. When I want to envision the power of 
simulation, I need only think back to certain childhood experiences. I can remember 
opening National Geographic to see photos of swarms of insects on the pages, and 
not wishing to touch the images directly. I can also remember feeling cold on behalf 
of scantily clad models depicted on billboards in winter. When asking students to 
run their own ‘flight simulations for design’, I ask them to imagine the experience of 
users of the space, perhaps holding their site model up to eye level to envision that 
person in the space. A mother carrying a child, a person in an electric wheelchair, a 
tipsy woman in stiletto heels at a garden party carrying a glass of champagne and a 
small plate of hors d’oeuvres. What will happen when the tipsy woman laughs and 
steps backward into the soft lawn? In simulating, the designer’s imagining mind 
is living the experience on behalf of the proposed site’s speculative inhabitants. 
The imaginal provides a facsimile of real experience. Is there a correlation between 
the facsimile and the use of media as surrogates for experience? In representation, 
the medium is used to stand in for—literally, to represent—so it stands to reason that 
this is true.
Sherry Turkle, in her book Alone Together, which addresses the problem of 
people retreating into virtual worlds that are surrogates for real life (‘RL’, she calls 
it, in contrast to VR, virtual reality) shows that the phenomenon has a dystopian 
aspect as well. One of her students, she recounts, says he sees RL as ‘just one more 
window [and] it’s not usually my best one’ (Turkle, 2011: xii). The problems of 
creating an immersive virtual world that allows people to live parallel and isolated 
lives outside of and away from RL are not, I wager, problems to be encountered 
in methods for imaginal design that seek to employ a vast range of materials and 
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methods to represent the world; and experiences of living and dwelling. In design 
process, the imaginal always acts upon the lived, so it is vitally important that RL 
does not become conflated with VR for the designer. The answer here is found in 
clay, pencils, wood, cardboard. Scenario-making has real agency in the world, and 
the utopian imagination is deeply important in combination with it, tying together 
human experience and human striving in place. Supposition in design takes on a 
prefigurative function, undertaking the awesome task of translating prophecy 
into corporeal existence. The more the corporeal and the sensual have agency in 
the design process, therefore, the more effectively will we design places that feel 
good and the more special we can make the lives and experiences of those for whom 
designs are undertaken.
Making Special
So far, I have not distinguished between the quotidian function of design and the 
art function. While they are interdependent and simultaneous, they still represent 
separate aspects. Landscape architecture and architecture are both fields of endeavour 
that must answer to practical and scientific concerns. Will what we build stand up? 
Will it stay standing? Will it shed water? Collect water? How can one make a big box 
better? The architectures must answer these concerns, and the last question points 
to the fact that, in the work of design for built environments, practical concerns and 
the demands of art are inseparable. Art is an essential component of designing and 
building places—in particular if there is a wish to make places distinctive—and the 
goal of ‘making special’ is fundamental to both.
Ellen Dissanayake shows that ‘making special’ is definitive of art practice: ‘art’, she 
says, ‘can be plausibly considered a biological need that we are predisposed to want 
to satisfy, whose fulfilment gives satisfaction and pleasure, and whose denial may 
be considered a vital deprivation’ (Dissanayake, 1992: 38). She toys with a number 
of terms to describe the necessity of the superfluous, such as ‘elaboration’ or ‘the 
extra-ordinary’. She ends up defending the ‘special’ and highlights the way elements 
of both play and ritual define the experience of the special. Here, when she speaks of 
imaginative play, try substituting the term ‘design’:
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In play, novelty and unpredictability are actively sought, whereas in real 
life we do not usually like uncertainty. Wondering whether an untried 
shortcut will take us to the bank before it closes on the day before a holiday 
is different from choosing an unknown path just to see where it will lead 
while on holiday. Play can be said to be “extra”, something outside normal 
life. (Dissanayake, 1992: 43)
Design allows us to venture down those untried pathways. Design helps us to find 
the special and the superfluous to introduce it into quotidian spaces. Indeed, I would 
argue—given the need to build distinctive places—that the superfluous, the special, 
are just as necessary to everyday life and everyday spaces as art practices are to the 
practicalities of building. This superfluity is not just necessary, but utopian. What 
Lucy Sargisson says of literary utopias is equally applicable to design:
Excess and play are core conventions of literary utopias… They perform 
several different functions. Excess permits radical creativity. Utopians 
imagine and desire radically different worlds but they often work with a 
light touch. They fool around with reality and tweak the nose of convention: 
transgressing norms, breaking rules and crossing boundaries. Utopians play 
with reality like a dog with a rag, twisting and shaking it until it breaks. And 
they poke fun; evoking satire and using jokes and wit as strategic weapons 
to show ‘it doesn’t have to be like this! (Sargisson, 2012: 16)
Richard Howells, in his A Critical Theory of Creativity, brings Ernst Bloch’s utopian 
concept of ‘educated hope’ to the ‘making special’ narrative of art: ‘[v]isions of a 
better world are encoded—often unconsciously—in art and literature, including 
popular culture. …Bloch’s vision is not teleological in nature. Rather, it is a process 
rooted in the principles of creative imagination and educated hope’ (Howells, 2015: 
2; emphasis in original). It is precisely the notion of educated hope in the creation 
of utopian scenarios that allows for new and better structures of popular belief to 
emerge, allowing us a ready answer to the question, ‘why art?’ Howells prefers the 
term ‘making better’ to Dissanayake’s ‘making special’. This narrows the range of the 
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discussion, however, by asserting that utopias, utopian scenarios, should primarily be 
employed as devices for imagining positive possible futures. We can’t merely employ 
unidirectionally positive utopias—we must imagine critical dystopias too. Lyman 
Tower Sargent calls this utopian/dystopian action ‘social dreaming’: ‘the dreams and 
nightmares that concern the ways in which groups of people arrange their lives’ 
(Sargent, 1994: 3). We need both dreams and nightmares to imagine both what to 
strive for, and what to strive to prevent.
Making a Scene
The imaginative ‘play’ that we call design has a special space—the studio. It is a physical 
space that is particular to the act of design. Like the theatre, the stadium, or the 
pitch, it has a particular construction that marks the space out for a particular role. 
Like ‘once upon a time’ and the set-ups it elaborates, the studio is a physical space 
that corresponds to a specific space of the imagination. While, as with other species, 
play can take place anywhere, there is still a particular role for this special place, 
which is the setting for a ritual that triggers the flow of creativity. When entering the 
studio this frame of mind takes over, and any interruption to the atmosphere can be 
catastrophic—or at least it feels catastrophic. It is certainly detrimental to the creative 
design process.
As I write this, I am sitting in the British Library in London, as I often do, and 
I am reminded that here is a special place for imaginative play as well. I am also 
reminded how much I resent any intrusion upon my space of solitary play here. 
As if to prove my point, a woman has just walked in and is unpacking and rustling 
around just opposite me; and a young man has followed right behind and sat to my 
right, wearing too much perfume. I note, looking up at the continuing noise, that 
the woman is plugging in and setting up three (!) laptops in her space. The space 
of creativity and play is mental, physical, multi-sensual (as the scene above shows), 
affective, and particular, and is also marked by prohibitions and restraints—‘rules’—
that are often internally imposed:
One generally finds, even in animals, “rules” of play: special signals (such 
as wagging the tail or not using claws), postures, facial expressions, and 
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sounds that mean “This is make-believe”. Often special places are set aside 
for playing: a stadium, a gymnasium, a park, a recreation room, a ring or 
circle. There are special times, special clothes, a special mood for play—think 
of holidays, festivals, vacations, weekends. (Dissanayake, 1992: 43)
The studio is the particular place where make-believe is enabled in design. Kyna Leski 
addresses the role of the studio as a space of experimentation (just as the space of 
the library allows critical experimentation), brilliantly and poetically speaking of the 
individual experience of material reasoning within it. Her narrative is a modernist 
one—with roots in the methods of the Bauhaus—in which learning to trust the senses, 
to trust the materials, involves an initial un-learning (though not a total un-learning: 
the student does not become a tabula rasa). All the prejudices and preconceptions of 
the future designer are stripped away, and a newly built Homo faber steps forth. This 
is a useful narrative with which to encourage the student to trust in the process: We 
are taking a portion of yourself away, but replacing it with something much better. The 
importance of that trust cannot be underestimated.
Leski’s methods and interpretation, however, are often too focused on the 
personal. The studio is not merely a space of trust and a space for the interaction 
of the teacher, the student, and the media they will employ. It is also an intensely 
social space. The imaginative work that takes place in the studio is part of a larger 
process of co-making, co-working, co-imagining; and the studio is part of the larger 
world of associations, professions, families, etc., all of which inform and support 
the individual. The musician Brian Eno calls this larger process the ‘scenius’, a 
portmanteau of ‘scene’ and ‘genius’. This concept helpfully reminds us that even for 
the seemingly solitary ‘genius’ painting or writing poetry in a garret, that invention 
emerges from a shared background of teaching, conversation, making, exploring, 
and feeling together: an ‘ecology of talent’ (Eno, n.d.). It posits a play-space/design 
space of situated, mediated, and intercorporeal social connectedness—a space of 
what Elaine Scarry calls ‘aesthetic fairness’—that ‘creates in all participants a state of 
delight in their own lateralness’ (Scarry, 2000: 114). When I sit and create a space of 
intellectual experimentation and play for myself, alone in the library, I bring along 
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all that has contributed to my current self, and I am reaching out laterally into other 
intellectual worlds with every book I open and every connection I make. Then I carry 
that back out into the world with me, in my own text, my teaching, my engagement 
with my profession, and so on.
For the architectures, particularly landscape architecture, the awareness of a 
‘scene’ must include not only those people involved in co-invention, but they must 
enter into a constructive dialogue with all the processes and forces that comprise a 
landscape: biological, geological, climatic, cultural, social. The landscape architect 
needs to employ a mode of thinking and acting that Lorraine Code calls ‘ecological 
thinking’ (2006). I prefer a term I’ve borrowed from ethnology: ‘toposophy’ (see 
Kockel, 2014), thinking that is about place, grounded in place, not just about objects, 
but about vast arrays of intersecting and interdependent processes and forces. 
Unlike philosophy—‘beautiful thinking’—toposophy is thinking that is always about 
somewhere. The term ‘ecological thinking’, useful as it is, seems to direct us too 
much towards preconceptions of the natural world, while toposophy engages both 
nature and artifice. Toposophy is a perspective, allied to what Tim Ingold calls the 
dwelling perspective, which treats people as organisms immersed in their lifeworlds, 
as opposed to what he calls the building perspective, which supposes that ‘people 
inhabit a world—of culture or society—to which form and meaning have already been 
attached’ (Ingold, 2000: 153). This posits that the individual must ‘construct’ their 
world in order to act on it, rather than being, from birth, an actor in concert with 
the landscape in which he or she dwells. These simultaneous and interdependent 
actions and interactions are described well in theories of practice, which hold that 
practices ‘should be treated as involving thought and action together, and in so far as 
this is the case, embodied theory, as it were, is a part of practice itself’ (Barnes, 2001: 
20). ‘Making a scene’ is connecting with and learning from others as practice; and 
as intercorporeal, embodied, emplaced sociality. This ‘scene’ contains conversations 
immersed in their lifeworlds. It makes connections with past realities; past dreams 
and ambitions; past constructions; and incorporates them as parts of possible 
futures. Thus it resists tendencies within modernity to clean the slate—where past 
forms and meanings may be expunged and new ones written upon a tabula rasa. 
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Here an unlearning of the past is necessary for total invention. In a scene, though, 
‘[t]hinking means venturing beyond. But in such a way that what already exists is not 
kept under or skated over’ (Bloch, 1986: 4). What already exists probably contains 
fragments and relics of past utopias, ready to be called into the future as part of the 
next scene. To those fragments are pinned satisfaction, fulfilment, beauty, and love; 
qualities deserving of continuity.
Making Belief
It is through imaginative renderings of possible future worlds that designers have the 
ability to influence structures of both belief and desire to positive and ethical ends. 
Worlds that we know to be physically and morally possible, but which have been 
suppressed by ideologies of selfish cynicism, fatalism, and nihilism; or hidden behind 
a smokescreen of agnotology (culturally induced or purposely sown ignorance or 
doubt; see Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008), can be forced to re-emerge. The ‘future as a 
cultural fact’ remains true, but its alethic valence has shifted from the negative to the 
positive, from the dystopian to the utopian. Truth has become the province of hope, 
not the grounds for the abandonment of desire and fulfilment. 
Another face of neoliberalism is the alluring glamour of the consumer object, 
which distracts us from more authentic modes of fulfilment. Nigel Thrift identifies 
this tendency and its amplification by media and social media, writing that: ‘[e]ach 
of these technologies demonstrates the singular quality of allure through the 
establishment of human-nonhuman fields of captivation, for what seems certain 
is that many of the objects and environments that capitalism produces have to 
demonstrate the calculated sincerity of allure if people are to be attracted to them: 
they need to manifest a particular style that generates enchantment without 
supernaturalism’ (Thrift, 2010: 290). The enchantment worked by capitalism’s 
processes militates against the sociality—common good the scenius that is needed 
to create true forms of common good and it distracts from education’s primary goal 
of emancipation, which ‘has a tradition that is not made of spectacular acts, but 
is shaped by a search to create new forms of the common, which are not those of 
the state or of consensus’ (Simons & Masschelein, 2011: 6). This emancipation, and 
all forms of utopian creativity, are co-opted by neoliberalism and are commodified 
Waterman: Making Meaning 21 
and depoliticised by it. In the process, the project of transforming the present 
by reimagining the future is crushed under the weight of an endless, enchanted, 
commodified, consumerist present. A sense of lateralness, interconnection, and hope 
is required to displace the weight of such a present. Elaine Scarry locates this lateral 
position as a site of beauty: ‘not now the suspended state of beholding but the active 
state of creating—the site of stewardship in which one acts to protect or perpetuate 
a fragment of beauty already in the world or instead to supplement it by bringing 
into being a new object’ (Scarry, 2000: 114). And it is not merely objects which are 
created, but new places and new dwellings where this beauty and connectedness can 
be made special, and may grow.
Hope involves desire, imagination, and belief—all three—and design insists on the 
addition of supposing as another attribute. First, we must simultaneously suppose and 
believe that hope is possible at all, and once that possibility is admitted, then the belief 
in a better future undergirds and impels the processes of aspiration and envisioning that 
are germane to design, but which can be led astray by cynical or fatalist attitudes, and/or 
by greed and hubris. As Pierre Bourdieu argued, hope also requires a collective effort—a 
scene—rather than a reliance on the emergence of a new and charismatic leader:
The whole edifice of critical thought is in need of reconstruction. This work 
of reconstruction cannot be done, as some have thought in the past, by a 
single great intellectual, a master thinker endowed only with the resources 
of his singular thought, or by the authorized spokesperson for a group 
or an institution presumed to speak in the name of those without voice, 
union, party, and so on. This is where the collective intellectual can play its 
irreplaceable role, by helping to create the social conditions for the collective 
production of realist utopias. (Bourdieu, 2000: 42–3; emphasis in original)
The ‘realist utopia’ is here one which is mutually created as a form of social dreaming. 
Jeremy Gilbert similarly argues that:
This is a very important issue for any attempt to think about the nature of 
democracy, because the assumption that agency, creativity and rationality 
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are qualities which pertain to individuals but not to groups poses severe 
problems for any attempt to base a politics on the possibility of collective 
decision making. (Gilbert, 2014: 33)
Belief in the possibility of positive change is fundamental to what is constructed 
and imagined mutually; and it is precisely this collectivity that is essential to making 
the future, whether through design or through the education which prepares 
the future makers of the future. The intellectual qualities and faculties of both 
individuals and collectives must be developed together. It almost goes without 
saying that contemporary education everywhere is subject to ideological forces 
that are pulling precisely in the opposite way from what I am arguing is necessary. 
Universities ‘cannot compel or otherwise bring about the production of the thing 
that matters most—intellectual quality, whether in teaching or scholarship or 
research’ (Collini, 2017: 44). The prevailing ideologies of our time, if not countered 
with other possible futures, will lock us into a loop of increasing authoritarianism 
(or ‘dirigisme’, as argued by Collini) and enclosure on the one hand; and ever greater 
precarity and liquid modern placelessness on the other. I would hope, though, that 
far from seeming like pie in the sky, my approach shows just how disconnected 
from problems of education, sustainability, and civic responsibility government 
and the management of education has become. As a result of the marketisation 
of educational institutions, education now mirrors the construction of society 
outside it and reinforces it. Education reinforces the nihilistic loops in which our 
political economy is mired, in which, ‘freedom is reduced to a market strategy and 
citizenship is narrowed to the demands of consumerism. The upshot is that it has 
become easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism’ (Giroux, 
2007: 25).
When designers work with communities to remodel their buildings and 
landscapes to provide for better futures, they should do so through processes of 
supposing and scenario-making, to find out how they can make more and better—
more special—what they already are. Design in the architectures is a process of 
becoming that addresses being and longing—belonging—to clear and prepare a 
space for play; for a shared imagining of the future and a striving towards it that 
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builds upon scenius and toposophy for creation that, by making special through 
make-believe and social dreaming, makes belief in a better and more mutual world 
possible.
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